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Abstract
Multi-agent models are a suitable starting point to
model complex social interactions. However, as
the complexity of the systems increase, we argue
that novel modeling approaches are needed that can
deal with inter-dependencies at different levels of
society, where many heterogeneous parties (soft-
ware agents, robots, humans) are interacting and
reacting to each other. In this paper, we present
a formalization of a social framework for agents
based in the concept of Social Practices as high
level specifications of normal (expected) behavior
in a given social context. We argue that social prac-
tices facilitate the practical reasoning of agents in
standard social interactions.
1 Introduction and Motivation
Interactions do not exist in a vacuum, but are surrounded by
many social and physical constructs that shape and constraint
that interaction [Argyle, 2009]. Understanding and modeling
the context of interactions is essential in the design of sys-
tems that are both realistic and computationally feasible. In
fact, if context is not properly considered “the patterns and
the outcomes of the interactions are inherently unpredictable,
and predicting the behavior of the overall system based on
its constituent components is extremely difficult (sometimes
impossible) because of the high likelihood of emergent (and
unwanted) behavior” [Jennings, 2000]. In human societies,
we use social practices as means to cope with uncertainty
of outcome of interaction. Interactions are embedded in a
broad network of societal and institutional contexts, and so-
cial practices provide means to deal with this complexity. En-
dowing agents with means to represent and reason with social
practices, will enable smooth, flexible, context-aware human-
agent interaction.
Applied to human-agent interactions, such as companion
robots, human-agent-robot teamwork, or persuasive applica-
tions, social practices can simplify the deliberation of the
agent in complex contexts. In these domains, the agent is
expected to support the user but there are no predefined pro-
tocols or fixed objectives, so agent actions must be based on
a close observation of the situation and evaluation of possi-
ble user aims, and reaction to user actions and environment
changes. This is exactly the reason for social practices in hu-
man interactions. Social practices refer to everyday practices
and the way these are typically performed by (most of) the
members in the society. Even though the subject of emer-
gence and evolution of social practices is an important one,
for simplicity in this paper we assume social practices to be
given and fixed. I.e. we will not elaborate on how the prac-
tice come to be, or how they are maintained and shared. Our
conceptual agent architecture therefore takes a set of social
practices as given, and the focus is on how the agent uses
practices in its deliberation and planning.
In this paper, we present a formalization of the the-
ory of social practices as proposed in [Shove et al., 2012;
Reckwitz, 2002] to be used as basis for a cognitive architec-
ture. Our approach can be seen as a middle way between
using fixed interaction scripts and full free deliberation reac-
tive to user and environment sensing. We build on the concept
of landmark [Dignum and Dignum, 2007] in the sense, that
social practices enable the specification of possible (abstract)
plans without needing to represent every single component of
the interaction. An agent will then adopt a social practice,
based on its evaluation of the context, and ‘fill-in the gaps’,
using its own capabilities and according to its own intentions.
We provide a logic semantics for social practices, based on
modalities to represent expectation, capability, roles, norms
and contexts.
2 Background
Social practices are accepted ways of doing things, contextual
and materially mediated, that are shared between actors and
routinized over time [Reckwitz, 2002]. They can be seen as
patterns which can be filled in by a multitude of single and of-
ten unique actions. Through (joint) performance, the patterns
provided by the practice are filled out and reproduced. Each
time it is used, elements of the practice, including know-how,
meanings and purposes, are reconfigured and adapted [Shove
et al., 2012]. Therefore the use of social practices includes a
constant learning of the individuals using the social practice
in ever changing contexts. In this way social practices guide
the learning process of agents in a natural way. In [Shove
et al., 2012] the social aspect of social practices is empha-
sized by giving the social practice center stage in interactions
and letting individuals be supporters of the social practice. It
shows that social practices are shared (social) concepts. The
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mere fact that they are shared and jointly created and main-
tained means that individuals playing a role in a social prac-
tice will expect certain behavior and reactions of the other
participants in the social practice. Thus it is this aspect that
makes the social practices so suitable for use in individual
planning in social situations. Because, in this paper, we con-
centrate on the individual planning, we will not see much of
the particular social aspects of the social practices.
The formal model proposed in this paper is based on modal
logics, extending work on agent organizations and land-
marks, in particular the Logic of Agent Organizations (LAO)
[Dignum and Dignum, 2011] that provides a formal, prov-
able representation of organizations based on the notions of
capability, ‘bring it about’ – or stit – [Po¨rn, 1974], attempt
and responsibility. Landmarks represent points in the plans
of an agent that must always be achieve. This concept has
been extensively used in the planning community []. We use
the ADICO grammar proposed by Ostrom to specify rules,
norms, and strategies [Crawford and Ostrom, 1995]. ADICO
statements are formed using the following five components:
Attribute (or Acting entity), Deontic, aIm (or Intention), Con-
dition , and Or else (or sanction). In ADICO Strategies are
statements including only the acting entity, intention, and
condition (AIC); Norms include the acting entity, deontic, in-
tention, and condition (ADIC); and Rules include all 5 com-
ponents (ADICO). The use of landmarks in the specification
of agent plans and interactions has been proposed by [Kumar
et al., 2002; Dignum and Dignum, 2007]. Formally, land-
marks are conjunctions of logical expressions that are true in
a state, representing families of protocols. The level of land-
mark detail determines the degree of actors freedom.
Related research on work practices and cognitive architec-
tures are the closest to our proposal. Work practice research
recognizes the inherent difference between the work flows as
described and prescribed by the organization and employee
behavior. The work practice model Brahams enables to de-
fine the behavior of entities by means of activities and work-
frames, amongst others [Sierhuis et al., 2009] but lacks learn-
ing capabilities to adjust priorities, and means to distinguish
between context and action preconditions. Cognitive archi-
tectures [Sun, 2009] use drives as basis to dynamically derive
goals during agent interactions. As such, it can capture the
motivational complexity of the human mind [Newell, 1994],
but it takes an agent perspective rather than a societal one,
such as the one we propose.
3 Characteristics of Social Practices
In Social Sciences, social practices (SP) are defined on the
basis of materials, meanings and competences [Holtz, 2014].
In the following we adapt an initial conceptualization of these
concepts, as introduced in [Dignum and Dignum, 2015]:
Context [Zimmermann et al., 2007]
• Roles describe the competencies and expectations about
a certain type of actors [Sunstein, 1996]. Thus a lecturer
is expected to deliver the presentation.
• Actors are all people and autonomous systems involved,
that have capability to reason and (inter)act. This indi-
cates the other agents that are expected to fulfill a part in
the practice.
• Resources are objects that are used by the actions in the
practice such as seats, projector, screen, etc. So, they are
assumed to be available both for standard actions and for
the planning within the practice.
• Affordances are the properties of the context that permit
social actions and depend on the match between context
conditions and actor characteristics [Gaver, 1996].
• Places indicates where all objects and actors are usually
located relatively to each other, in space or time: Seats
in a lecture theater all face the front of the room, etc.
Meaning
• Purpose determines the social interpretation of actions
and of certain physical situations.
• Promotes indicates the values that are promoted (or de-
moted, by promoting the opposite) by the social practice.
• Counts-as are rules of the type ”X counts as Y in C”
linking brute facts (X) and institutional facts (Y) in the
context (C) [Searle, 1995]. E.g., in a voting place, filling
out a ballot counts as a vote.
Expectations
• Plan patterns describe usual patterns of actions [Bres-
ciani et al., 2004] defined by the landmarks that are ex-
pected to occur.
• Norms describe the rules of (expected) behavior within
the practice, as statements of the form ADIC or ADICO.
• Strategies indicate the possible activities that are ex-
pected within the practice. Not all activities need to be
performed! They are meant as potential courses of ac-
tion. Strategies are specified as AIC statements
• Start condition, or trigger, indicating how SP starts
• Duration, or End condition, indicating how SP ends
Activities
• Possible actions describes the expected actions by actors
in the social practice
• Requirements indicate the type of capabilities or com-
petences that the agent is expected to have in order to
perform the activities within this practice.
Social Practices show some resemblance to agent organi-
zations (see e.g. [Dignum, 2004]), in the sense that both
provide structure to the interactions between agents. How-
ever, organizations provide an imposed (top-down) structure,
while the social practices form a structure that arises from
the bottom up. Thus instead of compliance, interaction pat-
terns in a social practice indicate expectations on the behav-
ior of its actors. Therefore no guarantee is given that behav-
ior will occur (exactly) as expected. This has a large influ-
ence on the way the social practices are formally specified,
focusing on possibilities and priorities rather than prescrib-
ing behavior. Cf. Table 1.A for an informal description of
how to use social practices. Expectations are given in the
form of roles that determine possible and expected behavior
and also indicate who is supposed to take initiative at certain
points. E.g. the lecturer is supposed to take the initiative to
start the lecture. Norms determine the normal patterns of be-
havior and thus also determine a certain type of expectation,
namely the patterns of actions that are allowed or prohibited.
The plan patterns also determine partly the sequences of ac-
tions that are expected. The different scenes are temporally
ordered and have a specific starting and end situation. Thus
the whole practice should be fulfilled by following a trace that
fits through that plan pattern.
In the next section we will start defining a formal represen-
tation for social practices based on the above observations.
4 Formal model
Because the description of actions and action sequences is
important as well as epistemic/doxastic states of the agents
we will use a combination of dynamic logic with epistemic
logic as the basis for our formalization.1
4.1 Activities
We start by formalizing social practice activities in terms of
actions and capabilities.
Let Act = {α1, ...αn} be the set of basic actions and
Ag = {a1, ...am} be the set of actors. We define a func-
tion Capability : Agx2Act that indicates for each actor
the set of (basic) actions it is capable to perform. We have
Cap(a, α)iffα ∈ Capability(a).
We use [α(a)]φ to denote that if actor a performs action α
the result φ will become true afterwards. We assume the ax-
iom: ([α(a)]true)→ Cap(a, α) such that we do not have to
specify the capability as a precondition every time we use the
action description with an actor.
We can generalise these definitions for unions of actions, par-
allel actions, sequences of actions and repetitions:
The set CA of complex action expressions is given as the
smallest set closed under:
(i). Act ⊆ CA
(ii). α1, α2 ∈ CA =⇒ α1 + α2 ∈ CA
(iii). α1, α2 ∈ CA =⇒ α1&α2 ∈ CA
(iv). α1, α2 ∈ CA =⇒ α1;α2 ∈ CA
(v). α ∈ CA =⇒ α∗ ∈ CA
Let γ ∈ CA and A ⊆ Ag then [γ(A)]φ denotes that φ will
be true after the group of actors A has executed the complex
action γ. Here we use γ(A) as an abbreviation for the follow-
ing:
Let γ ≡ γ1 ◦ γ2 with ” ◦ ” is ” + ”, ”&” or ”; ” or γ ≡
γ1; γ2 ∧ γ2 ≡ γ1∗ then
γ(A) ≡ ∃A′, A′′ : A′ ∪A′′ = A ∧ γ1(A′) ◦ γ2(A′′)
Thus if we indicate that a group A performs an action we
explicitly do not differentiate who performs what part of that
action. If we want to be more specific we can indicate the
1Given that we only need to represent epistemic and dynamic
operators, and not their dynamics, Dynamic epistemic logic [H. van
Ditmarsch, 2008] is not needed here.
specific group performing a sub-action with that sub-action
directly. Thus:
(γ1 ◦ γ2)(A) 6≡ γ1(A) ◦ γ2(A)
We use act(γ) to denote the set of basic actions that are part
of the complex action γ. It will be handy to refer to abstract
actions such as ”an action that achieves φ” or ”an action per-
formed by A that achieves φ”. For this we introduce the fol-
lowing definitions:
Let αi ∈ CA
αφ ≡ ∪αi : [αi]φ
α(A)φ ≡ ∪αi(A) : [αi(A)]φ
Note that if φ = true the abstract action refers to any action
that can be performed.
We use DO(a, α) (resp. DONE(a, α)) to denote that ac-
tor a performs action α next (resp. actor a performed action
α as the last action). These action modalities can be repre-
sented in the semantics of dynamic logic by introducing a se-
lection function on the links that indicate all possible actions
in the current state. (see e.g. [Dignum and Dignum, 2011]
for details). Again we assume DO(a, α) → Cap(a, α) and
DONE(a, α)→ Cap(a, α).
We also extend this notation to groups of actors and use
DO(A,α) and DONE(A,α) to denote a group A do-
ing an action together. Finally we use DO(a, α(A)) and
DONE(a, α(A)) to denote that a performs actions as part
of the group A in order to perform α together.
Besides actions we will also refer to contexts within which
an action can be performed. This will be especially impor-
tant when effects of an action depend on the context. E.g.
the effect of raising your hand can be different in an auction
and in a classroom. Intuitively a context stands for a temporal
and/or spatially defined interval within which an action takes
place, such as ”the lunch break” or ”the board room of uni-
versity”. There is a vast amount of literature on reasoning in
context. We will not tap on this literature, because we mainly
use contexts (in this paper) as reference structures needed to
specialize interaction expectations and beliefs. Every social
practice can also function as a context by using only those
parts that give temporal and spatial restrictions on the actions
and agents.
We assume a set C = {c1, ..., cn} of special context con-
stants (or names). Let SP be the set of social practice identi-
fiers then: SP ⊂ C. (Thus every social practice is a context,
but not every context is a social practice). We explicitly do
not have closeness of this set under combinations of contexts
in any way! We also do not assume that any combination
of specifications of temporal and/or spatial intervals defines a
context. However, we do have that with every element ci ∈ C
there is associated a formula Ψi written as con(ci,Ψi) such
that:
active(a, γ, ci) ≡ Ψi(a, γ)
meaning that context ci is active for actor a while perform-
ing action γ if the conditions associated with that context (Ψ)
hold for a performing γ.2.If ci is a social practice then:
Ψi → Scci ∧ ¬Dci
2This is a very simplified version of contexts such as is developed
in [Grossi et al., 2006]
where Scci is the start condition of ci and Dci is the duration
or end condition.
In general it can be the case that more than one context is
active when an actor performs an action. This is not always
a problem, but especially for concepts like expectations we
want to have a unique context to narrow down (disambiguate)
which expectations are relevant. Therefore we also assume
there is a function salient : CxC → C that indicates for any
pair of contexts which is the most salient. The following two
restrictions hold for this function:
active(a, γ, c1) ∧ ¬active(a, γ, c2)→ salient(c1, c2) = c1
active(a, γ, c1) ∧ active(a, γ, c2) ∧ con(c1,Ψ1) ∧ con(c2,Ψ2)
∧(Ψ1(a, γ)→ Ψ2(a, γ))→ salient(c1, c2) = c1
the first restriction states that only active contexts can be
salient. The second states that more specific contexts are
salient.
Finally we define Salient(a, γ, ci) as:
active(a, γ, ci) ∧ ¬∃cj : salient(ci, cj) = cj
which gives the most salient context that is active for actor a
when performing γ.
4.2 Beliefs and Assumptions
From epistemic logic we will use especially the operators for
”everyone in the set of actors A believes” (EBA) and ”it is
common belief between the actors in A” (CBA), They are
defined in the usual way:
EBAφ ≡ ∧a∈ABaφ
CBAφ ≡ ∧∞i=0EBiAφ
It is exactly the property that several parts of the social prac-
tice are common beliefs that makes them work efficiently.
Given the epistemic operators we can now also define
things like the purpose of an action (and a social practice)
and expectations within a social practice. The intuitive mean-
ing of the purpose of an action is the reason for which the
action is performed. It is part of the intended result of the
action and thus indicates that the action is performed with the
goal of achieving that result. Thus we define the purpose of
an action α performed by a ∈ Ac in a context c as follows:
purpose(a, α, c) = φ ≡ CBAc((Salient(a, α, c)
∧DO(a, α))→ Goal(a, φ) ∧Ba([α(a)]φ)
If we talk about the general purpose of an action α in context
c we mean that whenever any actor performs that action we
infer that it was done to achieve that purpose.
purpose(α, c) = φ ≡
CBAc(∀a ∈ A : (Salient(a, α, c) ∧DO(a, α))→
Goal(a, φ) ∧Ba([α(a)]φ)
We can make one more abstraction if we let α not be a con-
crete action but the representation of an abstract action. I.e.
γ=αψ or in general let γ=∪i=1...nαi then
purpose(γ, c) = φ ≡ ∀αi : purpose(αi, c) = φ
We have similar definitions for the purpose of complex ac-
tions. Let γ ∈ CA then
purpose(a, γ, c) = φ ≡
CBAc(Salient(a, γ, c) ∧ ∀αi ∈ act(γ) :
DO(a, αi)→ Goal(a, φ) ∧Ba([γ(a)]φ))
Note that this definition only indicates that the whole se-
quence γ leads to φ and does not restrict exactly which ac-
tions are part of that sequence. However, every action is be-
lieved to be done because a has the goal to achieve φ. In this
way we represent the intuition that each action of the complex
action γ contributes to the goal φ.
We can generalize this definition first by allowing the differ-
ent actions in γ to be done by different actors aj from a set
of actors Ac. And we can also abstract altogether from the
agency and give the purpose of the complex action γ. E.g.
checking the minutes of the previous meeting at the start of a
formal meeting is done for the purpose of creating common
ground and agreement about what happened in last meeting.
Let act(γ) = {α1; ...;αn} and Ac = {a1, ..., am} then
purpose(Ac, γ, c) = φ ≡
CBAc(Salient(Ac, γ, c) ∧ ∀αi∃aj :
DO(aj , αi)→ Goal(aj , φ) ∧Baj ([γ]φ)
and of course we can talk about the purpose of an abstract
sequence of actions δ=∪i=1...nβi:
purpose(δ, c) = φ ≡ ∀βipurpose(βi, c) = φ
Using the above definitions we can now give a definition
of plan patterns in a social practice sp. Let PP be the smallest
set closed under:
γφ ∈ PP
γ1φ1, γ2φ2 ∈ PP ⇒ γ1φ1 + γ2φ2 ∈ PP
γ1φ1, γ2φ2 ∈ PP ⇒ γ1φ1&γ2φ2 ∈ PP
γ1φ1, γ2φ2 ∈ PP ⇒ γ1φ1; γ2φ2 ∈ PP
γφ ∈ PP ⇒ (γφ)∗ ∈ PP
Let γφ, γ1φ1 ∈ PP then we use γ1φ1 ∈ γφ if γ1φ1 occurs
in γφ.
This leads us to the following definition of a plan pattern of a
social practice:
planpattern(γφ, sp)→ purpose(γφ, sp) = φ∧
∀γiφi ∈ γφ : purpose(γiφi, sp) = φi ∧ ∀γ1φ1; γ2φ2 ∈ γφ :
strategy(DONE(A′, γ1φ1), DO(A′′γ2φ2), sp)
where A′, A′′ ⊂ Asp. This states that plan patterns of a so-
cial practice are abstract (sequences of) actions for which the
purpose in the context of the social practice is to reach the for-
mula φ associated with that abstract action. And if the plan
pattern specifies two abstract actions in a sequence there is
an expectation that when the first part is done (by a subset B
of the agents) the second abstract action will be done. (See
section 4.3 for more explanation on the strategy relation).
Table 1: Social Practice application (A: informal; B: formal)
Social Practice A: Lecture SP (informal) B: Lecture SP (formal)
Context
Roles Rsp lecturer, student l, s
Actors Asp people in the room a1, a2, ..., an
play(a1, l), ∀ai, i > 1 : play(ai, s)
Resources Osp seats, projectors, whiteboard, markers o1, ...om
Affordances Afsp sit on, present, write with ∀oi afford(ci, aff j), aff j ∈ {sit, present, write}
Places Plsp lecture room room
Meaning
Purpose Psp All students learn topic
purpose(attend, sp) =
∀a ∈: plays(a, s), learntopic(a)
Promoted Values Pvsp attending lecture promotes Self Enhancement, ∀i > 1 : promotes(sp, attend(ai), SelfEnhance)
noisy students demotes Respect ∀i > 1 : promotes(sp, noisy(ai),¬Respect)
Counts-as Cosp student raising hand counts as has a question, countsas(sp, raise(s, hand), question(s))
lecturer raising hand counts as start lecture countsas(sp, raise(l, hand), start(lecture))
Expectations
Plan Patterns PPsp See Figure 1 α1(lstarted);
(α2(presented) + α3(q&a
′ed));α4(lended)
Norms Nsp when lecturer talks students are quiet, F (s, talk(l),¬talk(s))
student must raise hand when has a question O(s, talk(s), raise(s, hand))
Strategies Ssp students sit, strategy(>, DO(s, sit))
lecturer stops talk when student has question strategy(raise(s, hand), DO(lec, stop(talk)))
Start Condition Scsp 9am, students present, lecturer declares start strategy(startcondition,DO(all, lecture))
Duration Dsp 11am or lecturer finishes or students gone time(11) ∨ finish(l) ∨ ∀a : play(a, s), leave(a)
Activities
Possible Actions Acsp sit, talk, raise hand, ... sit(X), talk(X), raise(X,hand), ...
Requirements Resp topic of lecture is known CBA(sp, topic(x))
lecturer: knows topic, can present ∀ai, play(ai, l):
cap(ai, talk), cap(ai, raise(ai, hand))
student: has prereq. knowledge for lecture ∀ai, play(ai, s):
cap(ai, sit), cap(ai, raise(ai, hand))
start end Start lecture 
present 
end lecture 
Q&A 
Figure 1: Plan Pattern for SP Lecture
4.3 Meanings
Besides the above elements that are used in several parts of
the formal representation of social practices we also have
some more ontological elements that are used to describe
meanings and resources. Due to space limitations we will not
give complete formal definitions of these elements but refer
to other work that gives the (intricate) logical formalization.
First of all we define the counts-as relation
countsas(sp, α1, α2)
to mean that performing action α1 in context sp is seen as per-
forming action α2. E.g. the lecturer raising her hand counts
as starting the lecture. A further formal definition of this con-
cept of counts-as can be taken from [Grossi, 2007].
The second concept that we need is the fact that an action is
promoting or demoting a certain value. E.g. students talking
during a lecture demotes the value of respect. This concept is
used to indicate some abstract social effects of actions. Again
this relation is context dependent. We follow [Dignum and
Dignum, 2011] and use play(a, r) to indicate that actor a en-
acts role r. Let sp be a social practice α ∈ CA an (abstract)
action, r a role and v ∈ V a value,
play(a, r)→ promotes(sp, α(a), v)
indicates that if an actor a plays the role r and performs the
action α she promotes the value v. For a more formal charac-
terization of the promotes relation see [Weide, 2011].
Finally we also introduce the concept of affordances here.
Affordances are used to describe the type of actions that are
normally expected to be performed with an object and can
also be used to describe types of objects in an abstract way.
E.g. an object that affords to sit (which can be a chair or a
bank or ...). The affordance relation is denoted as:
afford(o, α)
where α ∈ CA and o denotes an object. One could make
the affordance relation also context dependent, but as argued
in [van Oijen, 2014] a context independent approach suffices.
4.4 Expectations
Many elements of the social practice can be seen as express-
ing a kind of expectation. As stated before expectations with
social practices come in different forms. The plan patterns
can be seen as expectations because they indicate the general
patterns of behavior that are expected. However, we also have
more specific expectations. Although not all parts of a social
practice are fixed there are some points where specific types
of actions are expected. E.g. if in a greeting practice one
person extends his hand it is expected that the other person
shakes the hand.
Let γ ∈ CA and let B ⊂ Asp be a set of actors (possibly
one), then we define strategies (as in ADICO) as follows:
strategy(φ,DO(B, γ), sp) ≡
CBAsp(CBBφ)→ ∀a ∈ B : CBAsp(DO(a, γ(B))
Thus if all actors (involved in the social practice sp) believe
that B believes the condition φ then they all believe that all
actors in B will perform their part of γ next. The condition
φ can be of the form DO(C, γ1) or DONE(C, γ1) or a de-
scription of other facts. The first two indicate a synchroniza-
tion and sequencing of actions, while the last represents that
it is expected that B takes the initiative to perform some ac-
tion when a certain state is reached.
Note that the above definition entails that if actor a ∈ B then
she believes that if she does her own part of γ the rest of B
will do their part of γ.
As stated before norms are also a kind of expectations.
However, instead of a belief that an action will be taken they
lead to a normative statement that an action should be taken.
In the context of social practices, the norms are connected to
the roles of the social practice. Thus any actor that enacts a
role in the social practice should follow the norms specified
for that role. Norms are now described as follows:
O(r, φ, γ) ≡ ∀a : play(a, r) ∧Ba(φ)→ O(γ(a))
F (r, φ, γ) ≡ ∀a : play(a, r) ∧Ba(φ)→ F (γ(a))
where O(γ) and F (γ) have the standard dynamic deontic
logic semantics.
5 Representing and Using Social Practices
In the previous sections we have described all ingredients for
representing social practices, which allowed us to fill table 1
completely. Formally a social practice can now be defined as
an operator with as arguments all the elements from the table.
socialpractice(sp,Rsp, Asp, Osp, Afsp, P lsp, Psp,
Pvsp, Cosp, PPsp, Nsp, Ssp, Scsp, Dsp, Acsp, Resp)
However in order to achieve the goal of using social practices
we should have social practices that can guarantee their ful-
fillment and give enough expectations to facilitate efficient
planning and deliberation. A social practice sp is useful
(useful(sp)) iff:
1. for all actions necessary to create at least one trace t that
fulfills the plan pattern, norms and all relevant strategies
of sp there are objects and actors with capabilities that
make those actions possible
2. if t contains a sequence of actions α1(A);α2(B)
with A 6= B then sp contains a strategy
strategy(DONE(A,α1), DO(B,α2), sp)
The first item indicates that there should be at least one way to
fulfill the social practice without violating expectations. The
second item indicates that interactions between actors in a
social practice are all regulated by strategies and thus do not
require explicit synchronization.
In the remainder of this section, we will briefly describe
how an actor will use social practices to deliberate about its
context and plan its actions. We consider an extremely simpli-
fied scenario of attending a lecture on social practices. Table
1 describes this social practice along the elements specified in
Section 3, providing an informal description and the formal
specification using the language introduced in Section 4.
We now consider an actor a intending to learn about SP.
Assuming this actor to follow a BDI-like architecture, the
goal “know about SP” would be part of the Intentions of a.
We further assume that both the social practice described in
table 1 and the prerequisite knowledge are part of a’s beliefs.
Actor a also has the capability to sit leading a to belief that
it could fulfill the role of student. By using a social practice-
based deliberation process, once actor a beliefs to be itself in
the context of the Lecture SP, it can then form a plan for its
participation in the lecture, based on the expectations, mean-
ing and activities the social practice describes for actors of
role ‘student’. This plan is very simple, a sits in the lecture
room and leaves at the end of the lecture. While a is sitting it
can ask questions when it does not understand the presenta-
tion. This is a reactive behavior that is governed by a strategy
and a norm. Thus all parts of the plan for the student are
given. In fact, based on the plan pattern of sp a can conclude
that by fulfilling its part, the desired result will be achieved,
given that it expects all other agents to fulfill their own parts.
For the lecturer there is a bit more planning left. The lecturer
has to plan the sequence of actions that will instantiate the
abstract ”present” action.
Note also that the current social practice does not require the
students to actually pay attention. In fact, the (expected) so-
cial effects of actions is an important issue but of the scope of
this paper. Social effects are not visible but can be assumed
given the social practice. E.g. if no questions being asked can
be taken to mean that students understand the subject so far,
and therefore no explicit checking is needed.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we gave a first formalization of social practices
that aims at support actors planning social interactions. We
have briefly shown that useful social practices can simplify
the amount of actions that have to be planned by an actor and
that it can make assumptions about interactions with other
actors in the social practice without explicitly having to coor-
dinate.
Due to space limitations we cannot present the full logic
nor discuss the formal properties of social practices that fol-
low from its formalization. We leave these for future work.
Another important area for future work is the development of
learning mechanisms that enable efficient matching of sens-
ing information and beliefs to the components of a social
practice description.
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